People's Solidarity for Social Progress

On May 29, 2000 cargo truck drivers and construction equipment operators gathered in protest near the National Assembly building in the Yeouido District of Seoul. These workers, officers of the Korean Public Service and Transportation Workers Union (KPTU), Cargo Truckers Solidarity Division and the Korean Construction Workers Union (KCWU) voiced their demands for fundamental changes in their working conditions and declared their determination to fight together until their demands are met. The KPTU cargo truckers and KCWU equipment operators have put forth the following demands: 1) repeal of the tax on gas and decrease of diesel gas prices, 2) increase transport and construction equipment rental rates (i.e. workers’ wages), 3) guarantee of unionization rights, 3) full access to industrial accident insurance and other social benefits.

South Korean cargo truckers and construction equipment operators are brought together by their similar employment form. Both groups of workers are considered ‘self-employed’ or ‘independent operators’ under Korean law. In addition, both groups work at the bottom of multi-layer subcontracting systems. Together, these conditions mean super-exploitation and the denial of basic labor rights.

Technically, cargo truckers and construction equipment operators own the vehicles they drive, which they pay for in installments that come out of their earnings every month. The commercial licenses for these vehicles, however, are held by trucking/construction equipment rental companies, which claim a part of the drivers’ earnings. These small-scale companies, in turn contract with larger transport and construction companies, who in turn contract with still larger companies who make the initial orders for shipment and construction work.

At the top of this system, the manufacturing, logistics and construction subsidiaries of Korea’s massive chaebols (conglomerates) make huge profits, while at the bottom truck drivers and equipment operators receive a pittance. For construction equipment operators, the widespread practice of delayed payments only adds to the burden.

As ‘independent operators’ cargo truckers and construction equipment operators must cover all the costs of gas and repairs. Over the last two years, gas prices have risen 20%, while transport rates for cargo truck drivers have fallen by 2%. Gas prices have soared, not only due to the increase in global oil prices, but also because chaebol oil subsidiaries keep prices high seeking to make a profit, while the South Korean government adds excessive taxes.

In addition, because they are not recognized as workers, cargo truckers and construction equipment operators access to industrial accident insurance and other social benefits is extreme limited. Worse still, they are not afforded the right to unionize under Korean law. This effectively means they are denied the right to collective organizing to fight for improvements in their working conditions.

Clearly, however, these workers have not allowed the denial of their rights in law stop them from proclaiming them in fact and uniting in struggle. Challenging the government’s unjust prohibitions, they have formed their own unions and now determine to demonstrate their collective power. The Korean Construction Workers Union has announced an indefinite general strike to begin on June 27. For their part, the KPTU-Cargo Truckers Solidarity Division has announced they will launch massive protests without forewarning at a similar time. As the two union’s proclaimed at a press conference last month, when this happens, “the flow of goods and construction sites in the Republic of Korea will come to a standstill” and “crises in the logistics and construction sectors will occur.”

The struggle of cargo truck drivers and construction equipment operators is more than a struggle about their own interests. Rather, they are fighting against massive chaebol’s bent on making profits of the backs of workers at every turn, and a government bent on labor repression. As such, their struggle is the struggle of all Korean workers, and of workers everywhere struggling against transnational corporations and the governments’ that support them.

RIAWM International Department

There were a man and a woman. Alive during the dictatorial regime of the 1970s, both secretly dreamt of another world. The two met at an evening school, where they educated workers as voluntary teachers in Gwangju, a southwestern South Korean city. While working hard to educate workers, the woman died in an accident. It was 1978. The woman, Kisoon Park, was 21.

After dictator Park Chung Hee was assassinated in 1979, and another dictator, Chun Do Hwan grabbed power through a coup d’état. Martial law was imposed nationwide. Students in Gwangju protested the repression of their democratic rights. The military suppressed them violently. In reaction average citizens rose up. They were met with horrible violence, beaten and shot to death. Civilians bore arms and occupied the city hall. The man joined them and was shot dead there. He had been the spokesman and one of the leaders of the civil troops. It was 1980. The man, Sangwon Yun, was 30.

In 1982, there a wedding was held at a graveyard. The man and the woman were spiritually bound together as bride and groom. A song entitled, "March for the Beloved", was written and dedicated to them. After, it spread secretly among students, workers, and ordinary citizen.

March for the Beloved

Our love, our honor, our name, not leaving anything behind

Our solemn vow to march together throughout our lives

Though the comrade is gone, the flag still flutters

Let us not waver until a new day is here

Time passes by but the mountains and streams remember

The ardent cry of the awaken ones

Survivors, follow as I march ahead

Survivors, follow as I march ahead

With the march of the democratization movement in South Korea, this song has come to be sung at the opening of every rally. Once in 2010, when the Lee Myung bak administration refused to play "March of the Beloved" in the annual ceremony commemorating the Gwangju Democratization Movement, twitter users voluntarily organized a campaign to sing along it. The song has come to represent social movements in South Korea. "March of the Beloved" also has impressed many activists around the world. The song has been adapted and sung in many countries including Hong Kong, Thai, Myanmar, and China.

*March for the Beloved

* Twitter users singing along the song (sound only)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Qnh3CyDkIpM

* Migrant workers’ band playing the adapted song in China

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vSUIj3Rp0fc&feature=fvst

RIAWM International Department

On March 25, thousands of Korean anti-war activists, union members and ordinary citizens gathered Seoul Plaza for a series of massive people's rallies. The protesters gave voice to many demands related to the livelihood and safety of ordinary Korean people: repeal of the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, the cessation of the construction of the Jeju naval base, the guarantee of workers' rights to a living wage and job security.

The first part of day was devoted to one issue in particular: The Second Nuclear Security Summit, held in Seoul from March 26 to 27. Protesters shouted "No to the Nuclear Security Summit," and called for promises of "Not 'nuclear security', but a nuclear-free world."

Many people are not familiar with the Nuclear Security Summit. Most Koreans had not even heard about it until the Lee Myung-bak administration began advertising it as the 'largest international meeting ever to be held in South Korea" a few months ago. Even after the billboards and television adds appeared, few have a clear sense of what the summit is about, given that that the government has done little to explain its details. The rally on March 25 provide anti-war and anti-nuclear activists a chance to spread awareness about the true character of the summit as a means for the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states to defend their nuclear hegemony and for the South Korean government to promote the development of its nuclear industry and export of nuclear power plants.

What is the Nuclear Security Summit?

The Nuclear Security Summit is a meeting of the heads of states and representatives of international organizations (the UN, the IAEA, the EU) to discuss the prevention of nuclear terrorism and the securing of nuclear materials and facilities. U.S. President Barak Obama first proposed the summit a speech in Prague in April 2009. In the same speech, Obama called for a world free of nuclear weapons, while paradoxically also promising that the U.S. "will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies," as long as nuclear weapons exist. The first Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington D.C. in 2010, and the second in Seoul last month.

The ideas of 'nuclear security' and a summit of world leaders to discuss it sound good. In fact, however, the term and the meeting are part of the United States' efforts to maintain its nuclear weapons dominance, while also appearing to take steps towards a nuclear-free world. The premise of nuclear security is that the greatest nuclear threat comes not from nuclear weapons themselves, but from the possibility that nuclear materials, the main ingredients for nuclear weapons, will fall into the hands of terrorists or other 'irrational' non-state actors. While the Nuclear Security Summit discusses cooperation for securing such nuclear materials, it does not address the fact that over 20,000 nuclear weapons, enough to destroy humanity several times over, already exist in the possession of governments who have not ruled out their use.

Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Weapons Hegemony

'Nuclear security' is a fairly new word in U.S. foreign policy vocabulary. Until recently, the focus has been on 'nuclear non-proliferation'. The concept of 'nuclear non-proliferation', enshrined in the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) [1970], is that states without nuclear weapons will be blocked from obtaining them while nuclear weapons possessing states will take steps towards nuclear arms reduction and eventual elimination. In fact, however, the U.S., along with the other acknowledged nuclear weapons states under the NPT (Russia, the U.K., France and China) have used the NPT and the concept of non-proliferation to pressure and control non-nuclear states, while refusing to give up their nuclear arsenals.

Recently, the Obama administration has made small steps towards nuclear arms reductions. These including the signing of a deal to reduce the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads with Russia (the New Start Treaty) in 2010, and consideration of further reductions currently underway. In fact, however, the U.S. is currently spending hundreds of billions of dollars to modernize nuclear weapons production facilities and develop new nuclear weapons that are more precise, less powerful and, therefore, more useable. The U.S., moreover, has repeatedly stated it considers a preemptive nuclear strike against its enemies an open possibility.

Far from preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the drive of the U.S. and other nuclear weapons states to maintain their nuclear hegemony has provoked other countries to develop their own nuclear weapons programs. Of particular importance in Asia, North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003, citing the United States' failure to fulfill its promise to provide fuel and light water reactors to replace its existing nuclear program. It has since carried out two nuclear tests.

Nuclear Security, PSI and the Escalation of Nuclear Tensions

In the face of growing critique of the contradictory nature of the NPT system and its inability to stop proliferation, the U.S. has recently begun to stress nuclear terrorism as the main nuclear threat. It proposes international cooperation towards 'nuclear security' as the best response. Like non-proliferation, however, nuclear security measures leave the United States and other nuclear weapons states' arsenals intact while further provoking countries deemed 'capable' of leaking nuclear materials to terrorists. Given that North Korea is high on the list, this policy contributes to heightened tensions on the Korean peninsula and, by extension in the East Asian region.

A representative example of international nuclear security cooperation is the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). PSI calls on participating states to stop and inspect aircrafts or ships 'suspected' of transporting nuclear materials or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and authorizes the use of military force in the process.

PSI specifically targets North Korean vessels. It has thus been taken by North Korea as an act of aggression, even more so since South Korea became a full PSI member under the present administration. Many scholars have also criticized PSI as a violation of international law because no international treaty regulates it and because it goes against the internationally guaranteed right of free passage across open seas.

In 2004, the U.S. sought to provide PSI with at a degree of legal backing through the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540. Resolution 1540 requires UN member states to take and enforce effective measures against the spread of WMD, their means of delivery and related materials.

Resolution 1540 has been a subject of both Nuclear Security Summits. A working paper submitted to the first summit called for its full implementation. During the second summit, France announced plans to host an international conference on implementation by the end of the year. Given the resolution's implications, these discussions can only be taken as acts of provocation by North Korea.

Safe Nuclear Power... Really?

In addition to talk of 'nuclear security', the Lee Myung-bak administration had another very specific goal for the Nuclear Security Summit: promotion of the South Korean nuclear power industry in line with its plans for nuclear power plant export. As a side event to the Nuclear Security Summit, the Lee administration held a 'Nuclear Industry Summit' on March 23. At this meeting, 200 industry leaders came together to discuss "safety measures" for nuclear power plants.

It has only been a year since a nuclear disaster the size of Chernobyl struck Fukushima, Japan, devastated the surrounding community and releasing radioactive materials that will effect residents and the environment for years to come. Just last month a dangerous blackout occurred at a nuclear power plant at the southern end of the Korean peninsula leading to an attempted cover up by South Korean authorities. Despite the very obvious continued dangers, the Lee administration's publicity materials for the summit blatantly referred to it as "a chance to rebuild trust in the atomic energy industry, which has diminished in the wake of Fukushima." The day after the Nuclear Industry Summit, participants were taken on a tour of Korean nuclear power facilities, a blatant sales pitch on the part of the government.

The Real Solution: A Movement for a Nuclear Free World

There is no such thing as safe nuclear power or secure nuclear materials or weapons. As long as nuclear power is generated, as long as nuclear weapons exist, we face a grave nuclear threat. In addition, the more the U.S. persists in its policy of preemptive nuclear strike and threatens North Korea with 'security' measures like PSI, the more likely it is that the Korean peninsula will become a staging ground for nuclear war. The real task before us, then, is not the prevention of nuclear terrorism, but the elimination of the more fundamental threat: nuclear weapons, nuclear power plants and policies that stimulate their development. That the U.S. and South Korea have held Nuclear Security Summits while refuses to acknowledge these realities is not only contradictory, it is highly perilous.

The rally on March 25 offered an opportunity to raise these issue before the Korean public and criticize the hypocritical and dangerous nature of the Nuclear Security Summit. It is now up to Korean anti-war activists to organize a more sustained grassroots ant-nuclear movement in Korea and connected it other similar movements around the world.

RIAWM International Department

There are over 400,000 janitorial workers in South Korea. Of these, only 7,853, roughly 2%, were members of labor unions as of 2011. Only 2% of some 400,000 janitorial workers in Korea are organized. Despite this low figure, Korean janitorial worker' struggle has received considerable attention for many reasons. In particular, Korean janitors have refused to be satisfied with South Korea's miserable minimum wage. They have fought for and won a collective bargaining agreement that guarantees them wages above the legal standard. In addition, Korean janitors have built solidarity across workplaces and succeeded in carried out joint collective bargaining.

Last year, janitorial and security workers organized by the KCTU-affiliated Korean Public Service and Transportation Workers Union (KPTU) at 3 universities (Korea University, Yonsei University and Ehwa University) and one hospital (Korean University Hospital), made the first attempt at a multiple worksite struggle and joint collective bargaining. The general strike of these workers - the majority elderly women - carried out on March 8, International Women's Day, made a lasting impression on the Korean labor movement. Through their struggle, these workers won a collective agreement guaranteeing them an hourly wage of 4,600 won (roughly $4), 240 won above the current legal minimum. The effects of that victory were felt throughout Korean society. Notably, 4,600 won served as a standard for the tri-partied minimum wage committee in its deliberations on a new standard for 2012.

Janitorial and security workers

This year the janitorial and security workers have expanded their struggle. Workers at Hongik University and Kyung Hee University have joined the four other worksites to fight for a joint collective agreement. The workers began by demanding an increase to 5,410 won half the average for all workers. As of now, they have reached a preliminary agreement for 5,100 won.

Unfortunately, this year the janitorial and security workers face new challenges. This is because of a revision to the Korean labor law that went into effect on July 1, 2011, which allows more than one union to be formed at a workplace, but require that their be only one bargaining representative. After the law was passed, yellow unions were formed and the school administrations and subcontracted cleaning companies have used them as an excuse to refuse to bargain with the democratic unions.

The yellow union at Hongik University is becoming a major obstacle to the workers' goals. The yellow union has agreed to a low wage with the employer and is trying to convince the KCTU-KPTU union members to agree to accept the same standard. The employer is using this as an excuse to refuse negotiations with the democratic union.

Workers at all worksites have agreed that they will not leave their comrades at Hongik University behind. They began the fight together and will end it together and so are confronting the Hongik yellow union and will not sign a collective bargaining agreement unless it includes the Hongik democratic union members.

Throughout history, Korean labor law has been used to repress workers. And throughout history, Korean workers have fought back in the fact of that repression. The story of the janitorial and security workers is one and the same.

RIAWM International Department

After more than 1000 days of struggle, workers dismissed from Ssangyong Motor's Pyeongtaek factory in 2009 have yet to be granted negotiations with the company's Indian management. Workers were dismissed in the process of structural adjustment in preparation for Ssangyong Motor's sale to the Indian conglomerate Mahindra Group. At that time, dismissed workers were joined by their still-employed colleagues in a 77-day strike and factory occupation under the slogan, "We will live and survive together."

Ssangyong Motor workers

The Korean government responded to the 2009 struggle with brutal and bloody suppression. It mobilized armed special police forces and helicopters, which rained pepper spray on the desperately struggling workers.

The struggle ended with the company agreeing to reinstate the dismissed workers after a year of unpaid leave. Yet neither the government nor the company has shown any accountability in the aftermath. Not even a small part of the agreement reached between the workers and management has been implemented. In the meantime, 22 workers and their family members have committed suicide due to deep sorrow and desperation.

Continuing the struggle, the Korean Metal Workers Union Ssangyong Motor Branch and many social movement organizations including PSSP have pitched 'Hope Tents' in front of the Ssangyong Motor factory in Pyeongtaek since December 2011. They organized national demonstrations called 'Day of Siege against Ssangyong Motor' three times in December, January and February. Thousands of people participated. On April 21, they will hold the 4th 'Day of siege'.

The Ssangyong Motor struggle epitomizes key issues faced by Korean workers, including mass layoffs, state violence and speculative foreign capital. We must build broader and firmer solidarity and strengthen our struggle if we are to win reinstatement of the dismissed workers, prevent further deaths and confront the wider social problems that Ssangyong Motor represents.

25 March 2011

On 3 January 2011, the South Korean Immigration Service, an agency of the Ministry of Justice, began an unprecedented program for the 'alleviation of hardships' for undocumented overseas Koreans residing in South Korea. Under this program, which will go on until the end of June, a large portion of the undocumented overseas Koreans ineligible for F-4 (overseas Korean visa) visas now living in South Korea, the vast majority of whom are Chinese Korean, are allowed to apply for and receive a D-4 visa (general trainee visa). After completing a 9-month occupational skills training program conducted by the Overseas Korean Technical Training Foundation, these individuals will be permitted to change their visa status to H-2 (working visa) and thus be allowed to work legally in one of the 36 industries now open to overseas Koreans under the South Korea's Guest Work System for a period of 4 years and 10 months. The primary targets of this program are Chinese and other overseas Koreans who have resided in South Korea for over 10 years along with their spouses and direct decedents. In addition, undocumented overseas Koreans who have spouses who have obtained citizenship or permanent residency, those who require treatment for the aftereffects of industrial accidents, those who are married to Korean citizens and those who have become undocumented after entering Korea on H-2 visas are also eligible. Overseas Koreans who were born before 1 October 1949 will not have to participate in the training program and will be granted F-4 visas, giving them a status near permanent residence that is now granted to overseas Koreans from Japan and the United States under the Law on Overseas Koreans. In reality, the vast majority of those who will benefit from this program fall in the first category. The Ministry of Justice has estimated that the program applies to roughly 6,000 Chinese and other overseas Koreans. Migrant-related NGOs, on the other hand, say the number could be as high as 20,000.

Reaction to this program has been mixed. Understandably, the Chinese Korean community and some of the NGOs serving it have welcomed the measure. Other forces in the migrant workers movement, however, have been highly critically. These groups (which include the Joint Committee with Migrants in Korea (JCMK) and the Alliance for Migrants Equality and Human Rights) have called the program racially discriminatory because it is not open to migrants of not of Korean decent. JCMK collecting over 500 petitions from non-Korean migrant workers, both those who have resided in South Korea for over 10 years and those who have not, and submitted them to the National Human Rights Commission on March 21, International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. On the same day JCMK and the Alliance for Migrant's Equality and Human Rights held a press conference in front of the Human Rights Commission to call attention to the discriminatory nature of the program and racism in South Korean society, and demand legalization for all migrant workers. The press conference statement presented this day, which was written by JCMK, also criticized the legalization program for effectively concealing the fact that while the National Assembly approved the application of the Law on Overseas Koreans to Koreans from China and countries in the former Soviet Bloc in 2004, this measure has not been implemented. It called on the government to replace the 'deceitful' legalization program with guarantee of freedom of travel, employment and residence in accordance with the Law on Overseas Koreans for these overseas Koreans.

That migrant rights groups used March 21 to call attention to the discriminatory nature of the legalization program is commendable. If the South Korean movement is gong to take on racism as a serious issue, however, we need a more nuanced understanding of the implications of the legalization program and how it fits into the government's overall policy towards overseas Koreans and other migrant workers in South Korea. The passing of the International Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination seems like a good occasion to start building this analysis.

Let's begin by looking at the interests and intentions behind the Program to Alleviate the Hardships of Overseas Koreans. The Ministry of Justice says the program is being implemented out of humanitarian consideration for the difficulties faced by (non-F-4) overseas Koreans due to their lowly economic and social position. We can guess with fair certainty that this is not the whole story. On the one hand, the program is a response to lobbying efforts by the NGOs serving Chinese Koreans. While it does not go far enough to meet their ultimate demand - the application of the Law on Overseas Koreans - the program is likely to placate them to a certain degree. In addition, the program is a means to address labor shortages in particular industries shunned by native workers with a cheap labor force that is more highly trained and socially assimilated than temporary non-Korean migrants who enter Korea under the Employment Permit System (EPS). Through the required training program and the granting of work permits, the government will be able to channel undocumented overseas Koreans, who may now be employed in any number of occupations, into specific industries where the need for labor is high while keeping them out of industries were native workers are facing high unemployment rates, most notably construction.

The Guest Work System, a program exclusively open to overseas Koreans, was first introduced in 2007. It allows for a 4 year 10 month period of residence. For the first group of workers who entered South Korea through this system, this residence period will be up in 2012. Since it is likely that many of these workers will remain in South Korea in an undocumented status, the government faces a potential social crisis next year. We can guess, therefore, that the current legalization program is also a means to test out the effectiveness of extending expired H-2 visas as a method for averting a rapid rise in the undocumented population.

The 'hardship alleviation' program comes in the wake of an announcement by the Ministry of Employment and Labor of an increase in the quota for new E-9 (EPS) visas in consideration of the vast numbers of undocumented migrant workers that have been deported and improvement in the economy. The quota has been increased by 14,000 over last year to a total of 48,000 for 2011 with the possibility of further increases later in the year. At the same time the Ministry has announced its plan to maintain the target number of H-2 visa holders in South Korea at the same level as last year (303,000), meaning that few new over Korean migrants will be permitted to enter South Korea under the Guest Work System this year. Given the implementation of the legalization program, it appears most new H-2 visas will go to long-term residents, not new arrivals. Clearly, the government envisions different roles for overseas Korean migrants and migrants of non-Korean decent. The latter are to be the most short-term, most expendable workers, with the more seasoned EPS workers pushed out at the same time as a never-ending supply of new recruits is brought in. The former, on the other hand, will be a well-trained, more assimilated and more stable, but still cheap, labor force.

The 'hardship alleviation' represents clear partiality towards 'fellow countrymen'. It, along with the recent granting of voting rights to overseas nationals and the introduction of a written pledge of allegiance to South Korea's liberal democratic system in naturalization procedures, is part of a trend towards strengthened nationalism in South Korean policymaking. Nationalist favoritism towards overseas Koreans, however, has a strong utilitarian element and is applied differentially based on wealth. The legalization program currently under way still falls short of granting F-4 visas to the majority of Chinese Koreans. The ultimate result of the benefits it grants will be to further solidify Chinese Koreans' position as second-class citizens who exist somewhere between migrant workers of non-Korean decent and Korean citizens (and overseas Koreans from developed nations) in the social hierarchy. This positioning is accompanied by an ambiguous racialization: Although Chinese Koreans are referred to as 'countrymen' [dongpo] in policy discourse and the media, overseas Koreans from China and the former Soviet bloc are still maintained as a temporary workforce tied to particular industries and are, as such, a target of government management and regulation. These overseas Koreans are still 'others' who have to register as aliens, while Japanese and American Koreans are allowed to simply notify the government of their residence in South Korea. In the workplace and in daily life as well, Chinese Koreans are treated as 'other's, lumped together with other 'Asian' migrants. (In South Korean racial discourse, native Koreans are generally excluded from the category 'Asian', which is used to refer to people from South and Central Asian countries.)

The government's utilitarian nationalism and discriminatory policies are contributing to the institutionalization of a racialized hierarchy in South Korean society where Korean citizens are at the top, Chinese Koreans in the middle and migrants of non-Korean descent from 'Asian' countries at the bottom. This hierarchy is part of a system of social control that operates through a mixture of appeasement and oppression. It also deepens divisions among the working class that keep workers from coming together to demand their rights. Chinese Koreans are being placated and incorporated as countrymen, or at least good 'migrants' who are deserving of humanitarian relief yet who will always be second-class citizens and the objects of regulation. Non-Korean migrants, on the other hand, remain outsiders and the most expendable form of labor, controlled under the EPS system or demonized as 'illegal' and 'criminal'. Meanwhile, native Korean workers are encouraged to see social belonging, political rights and employment as their unique birthrights and blame migrants, including and sometimes especially Chinese Koreans, for taking their jobs or creating downward pressure on working conditions. Being positioned at different places in this racial hierarchy makes it different for workers of different backgrounds to see their collective interests in fighting labor exploitation and the racism that facilitates it.

The 'hardship alleviation' program will be beneficial to some Chinese Koreans in the immediate. In the end, however, the racialize hierarchy it is helping to institutionalize is good neither for Chinese Korean workers nor for non-Korean migrant workers nor for native Korean workers. Accordingly, breaking this hierarchy down must be a goal and a struggle shared by all workers, regardless of their nationality and their position within it. The labor movement needs to be an anti-racist labor movement, one that finds ways to empower racialized groups that are systematically disempowered in South Korean society and the labor movement itself, at the same time as it strives to build unity between migrant and native workers. The migrant rights movement needs an analysis of racial capitalist and the place of different groups of migrants within it.

Together, we need to formulate demands that disrupt this racial hierarchy rather than perpetuating it. In this respect, the demand for application of the Law on Overseas Koreans to Chinese and Koreans from Soviet bloc countries is not helpful. While respecting the fact that these overseas Koreans are discriminated against with respect to Korean Japanese and Korean Americans, we must replace it with a call for pathways to long-term residence and political participation that applies equally to all migrants. The migrant rights and labor movements must join forces to develop concrete strategies for organizing Chinese Koreans, non-Korean migrants and native Koreans together to demand full legalization, equal labor rights, and ultimately equal citizenship rights for all.

16 December 2010

Wol-san Liem
Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements

This December 18 with be the 11th International Migrants Day. Founded in December 2000, International Migrants Day marks the anniversary of the General Assembly’s adoption of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of the Families (hereafter, the Convention) on December 18, 1990. Around the world, migrant workers and their supporters will use this day to demand changes in national policies, work conditions and social practices that are discriminatory and oppressive towards non-nationals, and call on governments to ratify the Convention, which sets minimum basic standards states must respect.

In the last several decades, recognition of migration as a global phenomenon and the importance of migrant labor to the global economy has increased significantly. Most governments now at least give lip service to the need to protect migrants’ human rights. Nonetheless, only 43 countries, the majority of which are countries of origin, have ratified the Convention. South Korea is among the countries that has not.

If we look at South Korean policies towards migrant workers, this fact is not surprising. The Convention states that, &Migrant workers and members of their families shall be entitled to effective protection by the State against violence physical injury, threats and intimidation, whether by public officials or by private individuals, groups or institutions& (Article 16, clause 2) and that they &shall not be subjected individually or collectively to arbitrary arrest or detention& (Article 16, clause 4). The South Korean government’s sole method for dealing with undocumented migration, however, is to carry out indiscriminate and often violent immigration raids, detain all of those arrested and deport them with out trial. The tragic death of a migrant workers as a result of these policies last month, shows just how brutal they are. On October 29, immigration officers raided a factory in the Gasan district of Seoul during a concentrated immigration crackdown carried out ahead of the G20 Summit. When Trinh Cong Quan, a 35-year-old Vietnamese worker and the father of a 4-month old daughter, found all exits blocked he tried to escape through a second story window. Quan fell and was severely injured. After lying in a coma for several days, he passed away on November 3. Far from taking responsibility, the Seoul Immigration Service simply claimed it had followed legally prescribed procedures and therefore owed nothing to Quan’s bereaved family.

In the area of labor rights, the Convention states that migrant workers shall not be discriminated against with respect to work conditions, remuneration, rest, health and safety measures and termination of the employment relationship (Article 25, clauses 1-3). In contradiction to these principles, the South Korean government’s Employment Permit System, maintains strict restrictions on the freedom to change workplaces and gives the power to employers to terminate labor contracts at will. By exacerbating the unequal relationship between employers and workers, this system enabling a wide range of rights violations, including under and non-payment of wages, forced overtime and lack of respect of health and safety standards.

Ratification of the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers signifies acknowledgement by states of their responsibility to work actively to eradicate this sort of discrimination. Thus, demands for ratification have important symbolic meaning. Ratification, however, does not guaranteed change, only a general acceptance of the need for change. Moreover, the standards prescribed in the Convention are highly limited, given that they represented the lowest common denominator to which the General Assembly could agree. Even more important, therefore, than demands for ratification are the struggles of migrants themselves to gain recognition as workers, as members of society and as the subjects of rights.

Many times the demands made in these self-determined struggles go beyond the rights guaranteed in the Convention. The Convention, for example, guarantees the right to basic education for all migrants (Article 30), but acess to educational institutions equal to that of nationals only to documented migrants (Article 43). In the United States, undocumented migrant youth are demanding more. They have fought for several years for passage of the Dream Act, which would guarantee them the right to attend college, access to financial support for higher education and pathways to legal permanent residence. This fight has not yet been won and the legitimacy of the Act has recently been tarnished by its attachment to the National Defense Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2011 and the inclusion of a provision that would require young people who could not go to college to serve in the military to achieve permanent residence. Nonetheless, the Dream Act struggle has empowered undocumented migrant youth as a real political force in American society and made their situation impossible to ignore. It has already given birth to dozens of talented young activists who will lead the fight for migrants rights in the United States well into the future.

In South Korea, migrant workers have been fighting for the right to freedom of association since 2005 through the Seoul-Gyeonggi-Migrants Trade Union (MTU). The Convention only protects the migrants’ rights to freely join trade unions and participate in their activities (Article 26). Since its founding, however, MTU has insisted that migrants have the right not only to join but also to form their own unions, a right which under the South Korean Constitution applies to all workers, regardless of social status. Through their persistent organizing in the face of government repression, the members of MTU have demonstrated that they are in fact the subjects of this right regardless of what the South Korean government says. Their efforts, in conjunction with the efforts of migrant worker in other countries, have led to international recognition. In November 2009, the ILO Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA) and the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) issued recommendations to the South Korean government, clearly recognizing the right of migrant workers, documented and undocumented to form and join trade unions of their choosing and calling on the government to immediately recognize MTU’s status as a legal union.

In addition to these unequivocal statements, the ILO and UN recommendations also recognized the South Korean governments’ continued targeting of MTU officers for arrest and deportation under the pretext of immigration law violations as contrary to the principle of freedom of association, and called for an end to such attacks. Despite these recommendations, however, the South Korean government has not stopped its efforts to undermine MTU. Following the arrest and deportation of MTU officers in 2007 and 2008, the Immigration Service is again after the union’s leadership. It has issued a summons to MTU President Michel Catuira, a documented migrant worker, claiming he has not maintained a legitimate employment relationship and has engaging in political activities prohibited under the Immigration Control Law. In the meantime, the East Seoul Branch of the Seoul Regional Ministry of Employment and Labor has cancelled the employment permit granted the President Catuira’s employer clearly seeking to give credibility to the Immigration Service’s charges.

These measures are an obvious effort on to undermine MTU. If President Catuira is found to have violated the Immigration Control Law, he will lose his visa and become immediately deportable. It can only be assumed that this is precisely what the Immigration Services has in mind.

Sadly, the pressure being placed on President Catuira has received very little attention in the wider South Korean labor movement. Perhaps this is because of the general weakness of the movement at present, or perhaps its is because such attacks on MTU’s leadership have become so commonplace. Whatever the reason, the lack of response is unfortunate for several reasons. First, given that MTU is an affiliate of the KCTU Seoul Regional Council and President Michel a KCTU officer, these actions by the government represent an assault on KCTU as a whole and the freedom of association rights of Korean workers in general. Second, as migrant workers make up an increasingly significant part of the South Korean labor force organizing them becomes ever more important if the labor movement is to regain its power and ability of to defend workers wages, conditions and rights. MTU, as a union organizing migrant workers, must therefore be protected. Finally, the attack on President Catuira is representative of the racist nature of the South Korean state, whose policies reproduce the low social and economic status of non-white foreigners. In that racism serves to divide us--to keep us from uniting as workers and common people--it is a structure of oppression that victimizes all of us.

Migrant workers and migrant support organizations will mark International Migrants Day with a protest at Marronnier Park on Sunday, December 19. Labor and social movement actors can show their support for the rights of migrants by coming at in force. As we celebrate the day and call for ratification of the UN Migrants convention, we should also make a strong demand for an end to the attack on President Catuira and the continued violation of migrant workers freedom of association rights. In the long-term. if we are to reverse the entrenchment of racial hierarchy in South Korean society and enable the unity of all workers and common people, migrant and non-migrant activists must use our collective wisdom to find new ways to organize and empower migrant workers as a social and political force.

10 December 2010

Wol-san Liem
Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements

Yesterday (December 9), members of the Hyundai Motors Irregular Workers Chapter of the Korean Metal Workers Union (KMWU) left factory 1 of the Hyundai Plant in Ulsan. Their departure marked the end of a 25-day long occupation, which they had endured without adequate food, water or bedding.

Today, representatives from the Hyundai Motors Irregular Workers Chapter, the Hyundai Motors Local Branch (regular workers), and the KMWU sat down with representatives from Hyundai Motors and its in-house subcontractors. In accordance with an agreement reached between the President of the Irregular Workers Chapter, Lee Sang-su, President of the Local Branch, Lee Gyeong-hun and President of the KMWU, they presented the following 4 demands: 1) Cancellation of damage suits and charges against workers who participated in the occupation, and payment of medical bills; 2) guarantee of reinstatement for those who participated in the occupation, 3) protection for strike leaders, and 4) a plan for negotiations concerning the regularization of illegal dispatch workers.

While negotiations have begun, it will be an uphill battle to get demands met, and take even more determination before the ultimate goal of regularization for illegal dispatch workers is achieved. Past experience including a similar struggle in 2005, has shown that without the pressure of a factory occupation it is not likely that Hyundai Motors will yield much ground. For this reason many of the striking workers had not wanted to leave factory 1 until after their demands were met in full, and originally pledge to continue the occupation until Hyundai agreed to employ them directly as regular workers.

In reality, however, the striking irregular workers have faced increasingly difficult conditions in the last several days. In addition to repression at the hands of Hyundai Motors, they have been put under growing pressure by the leadership of the Hyundai Local Branch to bring their struggle to a speedy conclusion. While the KMWU Delegates Assembly voted in favor of a general strike in support of the irregular workers struggle on December 22, it had not set a firm date. Meanwhile, President Lee Gyeong-hun of the Hyundai Motors Local Branch determined to put the general strike to a second vote at a Branch general assembly, despite the fact that the KMWU Constitution gives the delegates assembly the right to call for a general strike. When the Hyundai Motors Local Branch leadership could have been educating its members on the importance of regular-irregular workers solidarity and preparing for the general strike, it was instead suggesting to its members that it was time for struggle to be over.

With knowledge of the negative result of the Branch general assembly, and the reality that the second vote signified the cancellation of general strike plans and the loss of support from the Branch, the irregular workers set to heated debate within the factory about whether to go one with their occupation or agree to leave and begin negotiations with a set of less than satisfactory demands. In the end, they chose to accept the demands listed above as a basis for negotiation and entrusted the decision to continue or end the occupation to the Chapter leadership. After meeting with the KMWU and Branch presidents, Lee Sang-su declared an end to the occupation.

Sadly, the conclusion of the occupation demonstrates clearly the limits of the solidarity between regular and irregular workers developed in the beginning of the strike and, even more so, the lack of will on the part of the Hyundai Motors Branch's leadership to support a strike that it should have recognized as the struggle of all Hyundai workers.

Nonetheless, there have been important victories through this struggle. The consciousness and daring of a few irregular workers quickly spread throughout the Irregular Workers Chapter and from Ulsan to Asan to Jeonju. The hundreds who participated in the strike have been transformed through the experience, coming to recognizing their common cause and developing the power and courage to demand their right to be treated equally. They constructed and made use of democratic decision-making structures even in the midst of the cruel conditions of their factory occupation, and formed a still growing sense of class-consciousness. Despite the fact that they will return to work on December 13, Hyundai irregular workers have vowed to continue organizing among their colleagues and preparing for the next phase of the struggle for regularization. As one reporter commented, the end of the factory occupation at the Ulsan plant represents, "a victory for the Hyundai irregular workers themselves, but a loss for the labor movement as a whole."

It is the power of class-consciousness and unity that makes struggle possible. The struggle, therefore, will surely go on.

4 December 2010

Today, December 4, was the 20th day of the Hyundai Motors irregular workers occupation of factory 1 at the Hyundai plant in Ulsan. The struggle has grown since it began on November 15. Yesterday, the Korean Metal Workers Union (KMWU) carried out a work slowdown, with members of the Hyundai and Kia branches (regular workers) refusing to work overtime. Regional branches of the KMWU also refused overtime or carried out two-hour strikes. In addition on December 2, two laid-off members of the GM Daewoo Irregular Workers Chapter climbed the arch above the front entrance to the Daewoo plant in Incheon demanding to be reinstated as regular workers. They have vowed to continue their "high altitude" sit-in protest until their demands are met despite the fact that it is now the middle of winter in South Korea, and Daewoo hired thugs have blocked efforts to lift food up to them.

While several hundreds of Hyundai irregular workers continue to stay day and night without adequate food, cloths or bedding in the Ulsan factory, others have traveled to Seoul to make their struggle known more widely. Today, after a mass protest at Seoul Station Plaza, they and their supporters set up camp in front of the Hyundai-Kia headquarters in the Yangjae district of Seoul. The strikers will remain there with only plastic tarp for shelter until Hyundai Motors agrees to follow the decision of the Supreme Court and regularizes the in-house contracted workers it "indirectly" hires.

This morning, at 8:00am, Hyundai Motors' hired thugs used a forklift and crane to attack the occupied factory in Ulsan. They managed to smash in part of the wall and the window on the third floor of the building, but the protesting workers held their ground. According to the decision reached at the KMWU"s delegates assembly on November 23, the KMWU should have gone on general the moment the factory was attacked. But this has not happened. Rather, under pressure from the Hyundai Motors (regular workers) Branch, KMWU has lowered its goals, and is only planning partial for a partial strike in the next several days. KMWU needs to do the work now to make a real general strike possible!

The Hyundai Motors and GM Daewoo irregular workers struggle is not only about winning job security for a few individuals. It is a struggle against labor flexibilization being carried out by capital and the South Korean government, which affects the entire working class. As such, this struggle has great significance for the lives and working conditions of all workers in South Korea. In that precarious work and labor flexibilization polices are increasing across the globe, the Hyundai and GM Daewoo irregular workers struggles are, in fact, the struggle of workers all over the world.

Wol-san Liem,
Researcher
Research Institute for Alternative Workers Movements
23 November 2010

On November 15, some 40 temporary workers at the Hyundai Motors Plant in Ulsan City, Southern Gyeongsan Province, began an occupation at the seat factory, one of five buildings on the plant's premise. These workers were formally employed by the in-house subcontractor Dongseong Inc., which had announced it was closing down the day before. Hyundai Motors had told the workers they would only be allowed to sign new contracts with a different in-house subcontractor if they renounced their membership in the Korean Metal Workers Union (KMWU), Hyundai Irregular Workers Chapter. Choosing neither to cave to labor repression nor to continue to accept precarious indirect employment, the workers took action, demanding that Hyundai hire them directly as permanent, or 'regular', workers.
Management reacted quickly and violently to the occupation, forcing the workers out of the factory and sending twenty to the hospital in the process. Far from silencing their demands, however, the repression sparked a tide of collective action. With Hyundai claiming it had no responsibility to negotiate with workers employed by in-house sub-contractors, the Hyundai Irregular Workers Chapter called a strike. The struggle spread across the Ulsan plant, with workers in factories 1, 2 and 3 stopping production, and then to the Hyundai plants in Jeonju and Asan. While occupations and work stoppages have been temporary in most sites, hundreds of workers continue to occupy factory 1 in Ulsan as of November 22. Over 70 workers have been arrested and dozens injured, with riot police and company-hired thugs continuing to use violent tactics against the strikers.

The Violence of the State and Capital
In South Korea, the violence of capital and the state manifests itself in more ways than one. We see it, not only in clubs and shields, tear gas and pepper spray, but also in the desperate choices workers sometimes make--tragic acts of protest that give public expression to the deadly nature of the exploitation they face on a daily basis. 40 years ago the young worker Chun Tae-il clutched a copy of the Labor Standards Act and light himself on fire seeking in the flames a new world that would respect work and human dignity. Since his death there have been countless other cases of self-immolation: Bae Dal-ho, Lee Hae-nam, Lee Yong-seok, Pak Il-su, Jeon Eung-jae, Heo Se-uk, Kim Jun-il, and on and on and on. On November 20 another name was added to this list. At roughly 4:30pm Hwang Inha, a temporary worker who had worked at the Hyundai Ulsan Plant's factory 4, set his own body ablaze in the midst of a KCTU-sponsored solidarity rally at the plant's main gate. By some great fortune, rally participants were able to put the flames out quickly enough that Hwang, while badly burned, will not lose his life. This is an important comfort. But the strikers, their supporters and the general Korean public must come to terms with the reality Hwang's heat-wrenching act seems to confirm: Hyundai irregular workers' struggle is a matter of life and death, not only for each individual involved, but for all irregular workers, and in the end, all workers in South Korea.

In-house Subcontracting--- or Illegal Dispatch Work
To understand the significance of this message requires context. First, it is necessary to understand the conditions under which Hwang and his comrades work. What I have called "in-house subcontracting" above more properly goes by another name: illegal agency, or in South Korea 'dispatch', work. Dispatch work refers to the situation in which a worker is hired by an outside agency but is 'dispatched' to work for a different company. Workers employed in this manner are most often paid low wages and their contracts are always of a temporary nature. Moreover, dispatch employment allows the actual capitalists for whom workers produce avoid responsibility for their wages and working conditions. Hwang and his irregular worker colleagues work inside Hyundai factories making Hyundai cars, and yet they are technically employed by someone else. They can be fired at any time and make only a faction of the wages the directly employed workers who work alongside them make. South Korean law currently prohibits dispatch work in the manufacturing sectors, precisely because of these problems. In-house subcontracting has been away to get around this prohibition, and it is widely practiced.
In South Korean there are now two opposing tendencies with respect to dispatch work. On the one hand, the Lee Myung-bak administration is attempting to modify the law to make it formally legal in manufacturing, while at the same time making plans to completely revise the Employment Security Law to "strengthening employment services" or, in other words, to promote the proliferation of dispatch and temp agencies. These and other measures aimed at expanding precarious work are central to South Korea's "2020 National Employment Strategy," through which the government seeks to provide a flexible labor force for capital under the guise of job creation.
On the other hand, on July 22 the South Korean Supreme Court ruled that a worker employed by an in-house subcontractor at Hyundai Motors was, in fact, an illegal dispatch worker. The Supreme Court also ruled that, as a general principle, comparable cases of illegal dispatch work should be treated as "assumed direct employment." While the case has been sent back to the High Court to be retried based on the Supreme Court decision, the ruling has wide implications for workers employed by in-house subcontractors at Hyundai and, indeed, all manufacturing companies in South Korea. Under South Korean law, employers must give directly employed irregular workers regular status after 2 years of employment. The Supreme Court has told Hyundai that this is what it must do: take responsibility for in-house subcontract workers, employ them directly and granting them the same job security, wages and benefits as other directly employed regular workers.
The July 22 Supreme Court ruling provides important background for the demands made by the workers who carried out the initial occupation on November 15 and the central demand of the Hyundai Irregular Workers Chapter's strike that has unfolded since. In essence, these workers are demanding Hyundai do only what the country's highest authority of justice has told it do, an order which Hyundai is, of course, ignoring. But their fight is about much more than simply their employment status or one Supreme Court decision. It is a fight against the system of illegal dispatch work and all indirect employment. In the end, it is a fight against the government and capital's efforts to expand these employment forms as a means to increase labor flexibilization and secure labor power and profits at the expense of the wages, work conditions and job security of all Korean workers.

Regular-Irregular Worker Solidarity and the Role of Social Movement ForcesThe message and demands of the Hyundai workers' struggle concern the entire Korean workforce. The battle must, therefore, be waged with the strength of irregular-regular worker unity. In many instances, regular workers, who are the colleagues, friends, and relatives of irregular workers, are already showing their support. They have staged solidarity work stoppages and other actions and are channeling food and water to those occupying the factory in Ulsan. And while this response is not even (the leadership of the KMWU Hyundai Branch has been tepid at best), there are strong signs that the solidarity is growing. On November 22 the KMWU Delegates Assembly voted to hold a mass protest in front of the Hyundai Ulsan plant on November 23, to coordinate with the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (KCTU) to hold another on November 27 and to stage a general strike in the beginning of December, immediately in the event that riot police or company-hired thugs raid the occupied factory. This plan offers Korean metal workers the chance to make the Hyundai irregular workers struggle a struggle for the rights of all workers against the designs of the government and capital&--- and a successful one at that.
Social movement organizations, left political parties and all progressive elements in South Korean society also have an important role to play. The Ulsan factory occupation has brought to light Hyundai's exploitative and repressive character, which is representative of the attitude of South Korean conglomerates in general. Social movement forces can use this opportunity to organize mass resistance against conglomerates' abuse of irregular and subcontracted workers and the government's support for them by publicizing Hyundai's defiance of the July Supreme Court decision and the administration's efforts to expand dispatch and other forms of precarious work. They can and must also give mental, spiritual and material support to the striking workers. As the struggle unfolds in the upcoming weeks it is up to the South Korean left as a whole to recognize its wider significance and come out in force.

Solidarity from abroad means a lot to the workers occupying the factory in Ulsan, who have gone days without rest or adequate food. If you wish to send messages of support please email them to the Research Institute for Alternative Workers at psspawm@gmail.com and we will deliver them. You may also send messages directly to the Hyundai Irregular Workers Chapter of the Korean Metal Workers Union at: hjbtw@jinbo.net.